Profil de 寇德卡LebensweltPhotosBlogListesPlus ![]() | Aide |
|
29/11/2008 影评人的战争(转一个关于萨里斯、凯尔、桑坦格的帖子)记得以前曾经帖过关于保琳·凯尔和萨里斯的恩怨争斗的事,现在有一篇相关的帖子,说的比较具体,供大家可以参考。
本文编译自
It’s Only a Movie!: Films and Critics in American Culture Raymond J. Haberski Jr. University Press of Kentucky, 2001 作家、影评人Phillip Lopate记得很清楚,19岁时的他正狂热地迷恋电影。那是1963年,他在哥伦比亚大学搞电影俱乐部,为学校里的电影狂热分子放映影片,但他对自己的选片品位没有信心。终于他在影评人安德鲁·萨里斯(Andrew Sarris)的作品里找到了圣杯。萨里斯“似乎是因为电影能跟人的内心半掩的欲望交谈而珍视电影的”,Lopate回忆道,“但他是以‘成人’(adult,这是萨里斯最爱用的词)的视角珍视电影”,Lopate为萨里斯的英勇倾倒。对于一个笨拙有余的大学生来说,他的浑身幼稚之气绝对和“成人”沾不上边。Lopate在萨里斯身上发现了可亲可近的气质精神,开始拥抱更加大胆和系统的电影作品。 萨里斯在美国影评界走红的速度,连他自己都毫无准备。1950年代中期,萨里斯还是哥伦比亚大学英语系的研究生,1958年,他的生活就如同后来的Lopate一样,被电影改变了。萨里斯有个朋友叫Eugene Archer,也是未来的影评人,获得富尔布莱特奖学金到巴黎学习。Archer花了大量时间和那群在法国电影资料馆聚会并为《电影手册》写文章的年轻人厮混。他给萨里斯写信,讲他和这群人是怎样讨论好莱坞老导演的,这群导演当时在美国多半都被遗忘了。萨里斯大感新奇,于是开始找他说的法国电影刊物来读。法国影评人对待好莱坞电影和导演的态度鲜明大胆,那种通常只有对严肃艺术家才有的尊重态度让萨里斯大开眼界。 阅读这些评论改变了萨里斯,他写道:“1961年在巴黎的逗留,让我确信,电影不仅仅需要而且值得受到任何其他文艺门类获得的忠诚。”萨里斯经历了一场宗教信仰式的转变,他开始接受“电影神圣不可侵犯的重要意义”。他的新信仰让他欢喜连天,“不仅成了信徒,而且是带着外国观念的具有颠覆性的信徒。”异域元素对法国一派能吸引萨里斯起了至关重要的作用,同理也对萨里斯后来吸引美国的电影狂热者起了关键作用。但萨里斯并不仅仅满足逗留在美国电影文化的边缘地带,他决心杀入影评论争的聚光灯下。 60年代初萨里斯的快速崛起和两大潮流有关。第一,就在他刚开始运用作者论写影评之际,法国新浪潮爆发了,手册派影评人的批评策略随着他们在幕后取得的成功也巩固了其合法性。而萨里斯在美国影评界的声誉也因为与手册派的关系而扶摇直上。第二,这和美国国内的情况有关。1955年,著名影评人James Agee去世,三年后,他的文集Agee on Film出版。美国影评人的作品集结成册进入大众消费领域,这是破天荒第一次呢。Agee是Nation和Time杂志的作者,他对电影的热爱,以及对观影体验所拥有魔力的尊重,令他从同行中脱颖而出。 50年代末Agee影评出版之际,正好赶上影评人在美国获得知识分子般的地位。除了为严肃电影刊物写文章的评论人,Gilbert Seldes在继续提供有关电视、电影的睿智分析。Otis Fergunson、Manny Farber和Parker Tyler为New Republic和Nation写稿,他们早就将电影当作严肃的对象了。是这些影评人与Agee一道建立了美国电影评论的传统,而萨里斯这一代人便是立足于这个传统之上。
电影史学家Richard Roud在一篇写给Sight and Sound的文章中比较了安德烈·巴赞与James Agee的区别,为我们了解电影评论正经历的历史性变化提供了惊鸿一瞥。Roud认为,在美国,Agee影评的读者是日益开始尊重电影的一群人,但这些人仍然鄙视电影理论。而在法国,巴赞所处的环境大不一样,艺术、美学、形式比在英国和美国受到更加严肃的对待,他的读者对电影有疯狂的热忱。所以Roud总结道,“巴赞所处的传统比Agee的更加丰硕,更加扎实稳固,更加严肃。”就是在这种浅薄贫弱的传统下,安德鲁·萨里斯将会和他一生的敌人宝琳·凯尔(Pauline Kael)展开多番决斗,进而改变美国人对电影的认识。 萨里斯和凯尔都是50年代末崭露头角的,一个在东海岸,一个在西海岸。在提高电影的艺术地位方面,两位都比前辈影评人走得更远。萨里斯开始是为规模虽小却影响不低的刊物Film Culture写评论,后来跳槽到纽约最大的免费周报Village Voice。凯尔从旧金山发家,她各个方面都和萨里斯截然不同,后来她对萨里斯鼓吹的作者论展开了强力攻击。此二人的论战奠定了之后二十年美国电影评论的大体框架。在他们最风光的时候,有人说,因为电影变得越来越个人化,所以聪明的观众并不会讨论最新的电影,却会追着阅读最新的影评。 萨里斯1955年开始在Film Culture当编辑。杂志的创始人Jonas Mekas后来对推广先锋电影及“新美国电影”的运动更起劲,但萨里斯并不是这里面的积极分子,他将自己沉浸在好莱坞的历史中,运用作者理论作为指南,开始鉴别伟大导演的工作。法国手册派作者的影响对萨里斯显而易见。1961年,萨里斯在Film Culture上发表了一篇长文谈论老好莱坞导演,他心里知道,别的影评人对他所持的新方法正满腹疑虑呢。萨里斯文章题为《导演的游戏》,某种意义上是参与英国影评人和法国手册派关于作者理论的一场争论,客观上恢复了某些不知名导演的声誉。 和法国同行一样,萨里斯对主流日报上充斥着陈词滥调的影评十分不耐,那些人对电影没有激情,也不敢冒险夸赞表达上偶尔失手的导演。萨里斯说:“我们这些在美国拥护手册派法则的人,之所以这么做,部分是因为电影媒介的最深层意义已经完全与传统上平衡的因果论批评割裂开来,部分是因为手册派加强了我们本就对将宣传打扮成艺术,将意识形态打扮成思想的怀疑,还有部分是因为我们赞成影评人应热爱、呼吸和占有电影,而不是可耻地把它作为对现实的逃避。我们应皈依于这门艺术!这门艺术不再需要和其他更老或更时髦的艺术进行辩护式的比较。” 和法国影评人一样,萨里斯信奉好莱坞老电影,很多片子都看了几十遍之多。他的影评中蕴含着百科全书般的海量知识。随着纽约现代艺术博物馆开张,艺术电影院崛起,电视台频繁重播老电影,为萨里斯这种将一部片看上几十遍的影迷创造了条件。 萨里斯坚信自己言之有物,要与广大观众分享。在过去,严肃的美国影评人从社会议题的角度谈论电影,为影片所揭露的大众口味着迷。电影美学几乎没有获得广泛严肃的关注。大的日报和周刊上的评论家的工作差强人意,萨里斯说:“美国没有批评理论,所以影评界的风向变幻莫测,每部影片都只是一件开心或不开心的事件,仅此而已。”所以萨里斯提出,应重新理解电影,结合历史参照和理论解释,解释为什么一部电影是好电影或坏电影,为什么某些导演特别杰出?萨里斯希望把场景的建构、摄影机的位置以及一部电影通过情节和角色想表达什么都纳入到讨论中。 萨里斯评论Nicholas Ray的Party Girl,是他作者政治的小试牛刀。他提出,Ray不仅仅是个B级片导演,他也是艺术家,他的所有作品都值得敬重。作者论影评人在Ray的许多影片中发现,人物之间存在着道德张力,如果取消这些张力,故事情节会变得大为薄弱。萨里斯的写作展示影评的边界是灵活、可自由延伸的。采用适当的批评工具,观众可以透过影片贫瘠的表面,进入核心的区域。 萨里斯接着在下一期的Film Culture继续挑起争论,他写了最著名的Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962。文章分成两部分,前半部分是证明作者论的正确性,后半部分是具体解释。不过萨里斯也承认,如果不进行必需的研究分析,作者理论将退化成美术交易一样的势利行当。虽然为导演排序多少有些武断,但他坚持认为因为电影还没有完全被确立为一种艺术,所以需要更加野心勃勃的影评人,先得为导演建立起一座万神殿,如果缺乏这种勇气,影评人的工作毫无价值。 为了平反过去的冤假错案,萨里斯有操之过急、矫枉过正的嫌疑。他过分地褒扬某些曾被怠慢的好莱坞导演,结果不少优秀外国导演的地位就被顺延了——在很多其他美国影评人看来,外国导演应比好莱坞导演更受关注。但萨里斯觉得自己用作者理论作为批评策略记录美国电影历史,是一个开创性的举动。 毫不奇怪,萨里斯不大瞧得上美国的影评同行。他觉得因为美国缺乏值得信赖的电影理论,他的同行们根本不懂他支持的作者论,所以会心生抵触。他说,除非我们也拥有自己的巴赞,否则美国影评界不可能有足以与法国人并驾齐驱的理论。他还痛批美国影评人没有文化,不思进取,所以美国电影在人们眼中没有达到欧洲电影那种艺术地位,只有他的理论能帮助好莱坞克服自卑情结。 萨里斯将作者论比喻成三个同心圆,每一层都对应导演万神殿里的一组导演。最外层是技术能力,如果一个导演在技术上没有竞争力,对电影的天份不够,没有资格进入万神殿。第二层的导演有能力重复表现某种风格特征,作为自己独特的signature。最里面一层的导演也是最重要的,但定义也最模糊,与“内在含义”或“导演个性和他的材料之间的张力”有关。 宝琳·凯尔读了萨里斯的理论后,很不以为然,于是花了14页的篇幅在《电影季刊》上一一驳斥。虽然萨里斯的理论远非无懈可击,但凯尔的批评也有避实就虚之嫌,她的文章实际上可看作是对当时正在兴起的准理论化影评的攻击。凯尔反问,是什么让你把Raoul Walsh归为作者的呢?难道没有作者理论,你就注意不到他影片中某些重复出现的东西吗?法国的巴赞,美国的Agee,之所以伟大,可能是因为他们广博的智慧与直觉,而不是靠着一套公式吃饭。凯尔认为,萨里斯不仅仅侮辱了美国的影评人,他的作为在损害美国的电影评论。“作者理论可能帮助法国人释放了能量,但是在英国和美国它扮演了反智、反艺术的角色!”凯尔这样说。 但凯尔和萨里斯有一点是相同的,那就是对电影无与伦比的热爱和尊重。所以这也许能解释凯尔向萨里斯进攻的火力如此之猛,因为她认为电影好不容易征服了那些文化保守主义者和艺术精英论者对电影长达数个世代的轻蔑,但作者论的出现有令这一胜利前功尽弃的嫌疑。明明有一些作品是公认的失败之作,但作者论通过对特定导演的莫名其妙的追捧将这些影片奉为大师杰作,这对那些导演本人来说恐怕也是出黑色喜剧呢。这真是1984的美学:失败即成功。 另外一点让凯尔很不爽的是作者论不仅将“垃圾”(trash,似乎她很喜欢在文章中用这个词)抬高到艺术的层次,而且体现出一种奇怪的男性沙文主义。为了提高导演的地位,作者论者牺牲了制片人、编剧、演员等重要的创作者,尤其是对女人很不公平,像Gish姐妹,Mary Pickford、Bette Davis等女演员,很多影片是专为她们而拍的,怎么能说她们毫无影响呢?还有好莱坞早期的顶级编剧Anita Loos、帮助研发Technicolor的Natalie Kalmas以及身为导演的Dorothy Arzner。除了为女人抱不平,凯尔还觉得作者论忽视了位高权重的片厂老板的作用,像David O. Selznick、Irving Thalberg和Loius B. Mayer等。 凯尔请编辑将她对萨里斯的批评寄了一份给后者,意思是请他回应。萨里斯后来不快地回忆,凯尔仿佛觉得她的批评是对萨里斯的恩惠,因为她用他的方式指出了他的谬误,所以他应该感激。但实际上,萨里斯觉得蛮受伤。用《电影季刊》编辑的话说,其实凯尔和萨里斯的体内都没那根理论的筋,凯尔之所以会冲萨里斯进攻,是因为他想新建一个体系的努力冒犯了她,所以她将萨里斯视作对她的威胁。 不过萨里斯并没有正面回应凯尔,他写了两篇关于作者理论的新文章。一篇发表在Film Culture,长达68页,名为《美国电影》,详细分析了许多位好莱坞导演。萨里斯觉得只要还有优秀的导演还不为人所知,他发掘默默无闻导演的工作决不能停止。 萨里斯第二篇文章叫做《作者理论与宝琳之祸》算是对凯尔文章的的答辩,顺道他还批评了《电影季刊》将所有作者论影评人混为一谈的做法,他说虽然作者论是为电影分门别类的最有效方法,但这从来不是什么邪教仪式。 萨里斯玩了一个有趣的智力游戏,他将他为导演划分层次的理论和文学批评家为作家排座次的行为相提并论,但他指出,这之间的区别一是电影,一是文学。他解释作者论能帮助影迷认识到导演的风格——通过分析他的一系列作品。 界定谁是一部电影的真正作者,这不是什么新鲜的话题,但萨里斯仍然提出了一些新意。他承认,影片的故事多半不是导演先想出来的,因为导演的工作主要是将语言文字的作品转变成影像,影评人不需要分析电影的内容,只需要分析导演的“风格”就行了。电影作者就是拿到一个剧本,不管是否详尽,能用个人特殊趣味进行阐释的导演。在很多美国的影评人看来,怎么能把形式从内容分割开来呢?萨里斯认为,影评人很少从纯粹的美学角度来探讨电影。但对他来说,必须将形式置于比内容更高的层面来看待。 萨里斯和凯尔的争鸣在美国影评界反响颇大,这说明电影批评的革新其实已迫在眉睫。有两个作者的文章对这场讨论产生了积极影响。先是Marion Magid,此人试图搞清楚为什么萨里斯的方法怎么流行。然后是Dwight Macdonald,他是有名的文化评论家,也为Esquire杂志写影评,他的文章总结了萨里斯所造成的破坏。 到底为什么,几个法国影评人提出的理论会成为大洋彼岸一个显著的文化现象呢?Magid认为这和作者论的基础“场面调度”脱不了干系。作者论给它的实践者带来一种权威感,这些影评人不需要背负其他艺术门类的评论家必须要接受的分析。他只要列一个导演的单子,然后用作者论的语言包装一下,就可以得到同类人的支持。在关于作者论的争议中,最激烈的战斗是源于导演的选择,而并非选择这些导演的原因。例如任何电影刊物的立场只需要看看他的刊首语对希区柯克的评价即可,或者看每部希区柯克新片上映时你的评价如何。一般来说,全面认可他从20年代一直到《群鸟》的所有作品是作者论者的一个标志,如果对《群鸟》、《精神病患者》有所保留,那这就意味着你是反形式主义啦。 Macdonald广义上是个文化批评人,他是纽约知识分子圈里的精英分子,1960年曾在Partisan Review上发表过一篇影响深远的文章Masscult and Midcult。他提出当代美国文化中有两大恶劣特征,一是大众文化铺天盖地的接受度,他称为Masscult,一是高雅文化的腐烂堕落,他称之为Midcult。在大众传媒变得发达之前,大多数美国人不可能在同时经历某种文化体验。但是广播、电视以及电影的出现,新的时代来临了。艺术家为大众口味生产作品,而不再是为了有艺术修养的高雅人群。艺术的商业化不仅改变了评判艺术的标准,也改变了艺术创作的过程。Masscult是失败的艺术,其实更是非艺术,和反艺术的。好莱坞电影的流行,让这种局面更严峻了,因为大众文化开始披着民主的伪装流行。Macdonald虽然狠狠地批评了大众文化,他还是肯定masscult非常的民主,进而他认为,萨里斯对一些低质素好莱坞电影谀辞如潮,不仅愚蠢,而且危险。为了捍卫作者论,萨里斯采用了一些高雅艺术批评中常用的术语,Macdonald解释说,Midcult有其两面性,它一方面假装尊重高雅艺术的标准,但实际上是搀水的、庸俗化的高雅艺术;另一方面它将自己呈现为高雅艺术的一部分。萨里斯用作者论来提升那些庸俗的东西,故意混淆先锋和主流的界限。 Macdonald的大众文化批评论代表着如果界定艺术的争论中的一派意见,于是评论家又开始选择阵营。如同现代主义者当初拒绝上流社会的传统,拥抱前卫艺术一样,60年代的反叛者们和现代主义分道扬镳,将大众化的电影奉为年轻一代的艺术。作者论让Macdonald不爽,因为他和对手根本无法展开争论,因为两边说的是不同的语言。不管对方如何批评,像凯尔一样挑战,像Magid一样调侃,像Macdonald一样攻击,作者论者似乎无动于衷,稳如泰山。 宝琳·凯尔是个不依不饶的毒舌影评人,只要别人轻易接受的观点,她多半会质疑。她如雷贯耳的名气源于强硬、难以取悦的作风,加上文笔非凡。她树敌众多,曾因痛骂《音乐之声》被女性杂志McCall’s开除。凯尔和萨里斯之间的对立,远非批评方法有异那么简单。凯尔生养于旧金山,而萨里斯来自纽约。凯尔就读于加州大学伯克利分校,从旧金山的一家公立电台开始了影评生涯。1950年代末她为《电影季刊》、Sight and Sound写作,还开过艺术电影院。萨里斯为Village Voice和先锋刊物Film Culture写稿。他参加Amos Vogel的Cinema 16组织的实验电影放映,关注纽约的地下电影运动。换句话说,萨里斯背后有纽约电影社团组织的影响,而凯尔的环境缺少这种氛围。 但两人有一个共同点:都与观众的联系紧密,过去的影评人很少能做到这一点。但在如何将观众带进电影院,两人自有一套。凯尔抒发她对伟大电影的热爱,藉由文笔和激情来灌输她的观点。萨里斯当然也热爱电影,但他所处的纽约社团环境对好莱坞敌意深重,他可能觉得,要用外国的理论来掩护他对好莱坞的迷恋之情。 萨里斯的写作与60年代初批评界的一股潜流暗合,那就是将传统的批评方法残留的痕迹抛到九霄云外。凯尔则代表着另一股潜流,它的上游发源于现代主义思想。她的文章与文化保守主义者针锋相对,那帮人轻视电影,认为影评人不过是枪手而已。但她还是拥护过去的评论传统的,她在旧传统之上建功立业。虽然纽约的现代主义者也对萨里斯有一定影响,但他的影评与老派的规则无关。萨里斯是这样的:“这部片子我这么看,不过你可以有不同看法,我把我的理解告诉你,你可以衡量衡量,然后根据自己的体验来理解它。”萨里斯不想在观众面前充权威,他只是想和他们分享对电影艺术的热情。但凯尔有所不同,她把自己看作是观众和影片之间的中介,她要告诉观众,什么是好的,什么是坏的。 Phillip Lopate将凯尔的影评作品首先视作美国文学创作中的一大成就,可与Edmund Wilson和H.L. Mencken相提并论。实际上,凯尔不仅是在评论电影,她也是个文化批评人,其如雷贯耳的声名也让她拥有塑造文化标准的权威。她同时攻击两种人,自视过高或者太严肃对待大众文化的人都逃不掉。1956年,她写了篇题为《电影,绝望的艺术》的文章,通过此文她树立了自己的影评商标,她贬低好莱坞50年代盛行的温和自由主义,贬低Stanley Kramer的作品外强中干,空洞无物。反过来她又痛骂先锋电影,说“拒绝好莱坞,你是装逼,拒绝先锋电影,你是傻逼”,但有时候你不得不二者兼备。 另外,凯尔拒绝深奥和纯理论。她为克拉考尔《电影的本性》写书评,狠狠地将作者揶揄一番,她写道:“克拉考尔是那种没法简单地把‘今天真愉快’这句话说出口的人,因为如果不先给‘天’下一个定义,那么这个术语就无法和‘晚上’区分开来……他建立了一个认识论系统来支持他觉得这一‘天’很愉快的权利,可读了这样的书,我们这一‘天’就被他白白糟蹋了。”连带被凯尔损了一通的权威还有著名电影史学家Paul Rotha和Richard Griffith,因为他们为克拉考尔的书写了推荐语。 1964年4月,凯尔用一篇发表在《大西洋月刊》的长文巩固了她在西海岸影评界的地位,同时,她还获得一笔资助,用来出版了她的文集I Lost It at the Movies,里面的主打文章是Are the Movies Going to Pieces。照Macdonald的大众文化批评论看来,此文有特殊的地位,可能是现代主义时代的最后一篇评论文章,而苏珊·桑塔格的《一种文化与新感受力》该被视为后现代主义的第一篇论文。 凯尔的文章开篇先讲述了她和青年朋友的一次聚会,一个男生的话让她发现现在的年轻观众已经厌倦了电影的逻辑和严谨的故事,他们需要感官刺激,解释性的情节只是影片的填充。用Theodore Dreiser的话说,美国制造出一代人盲目接受傻瓜艺术。 凯尔也批评Jonas Mekas鼓吹的“新美国电影”。她认为,要不是苏珊·桑塔格这样的评论人给予他们知识分子的尊重,Mekas的胡话原不至于谬种流传。凯尔指出,桑塔格为《火热动物》(Flaming Creatures)写的评论是个典型的例子,“一视同仁、没有主见”,“不分青红皂白也有意义的话,桑塔格小姐可真是个真正的潮人哪。当然我们也可以回答说,既然什么都行得通,那实际上什么都没有发生,什么都不起作用。” 凯尔的姿态,在年轻人眼里看来自然是落伍了,他们将凯尔归为老迈的“Agee-酒精的一代”,是不会懂得年轻的“LSD一代”很容易就明白的事,那就是:接受一切事物。凯尔说:“为什么电影必须表达一点什么意思?你会期待巴赫的作品说点什么吗?……要是我们拒绝评论的标准,接受每个人说自己是艺术家,把他所谓的反商业作品奉为艺术,桑塔格正在做的事如果让她继续下去,评论的末日就到了。” 当回顾起与宝琳·凯尔的争论,安德鲁·萨里斯认为,虽然自己和苏珊·桑塔格都成为了当时的文化先锋,但凯尔替文化权威喊出了怕被不分青红皂白的野蛮人入侵的担心,反而脱颖而出。萨里斯将凯尔和另外更老一代的评论家连锅端,指出她的“共谋身份”,说她“不想把电影,特别是美国电影,提升到人文艺术的层次。她的I Lost It at the Movies依然在诽谤电影学者和电影学术。” 萨里斯是对的。凯尔的确担心某一天电影不再是“唯一一种每个人都可以自由享受并发表意见的艺术了,它变成了和音乐、美术一样的东西,成为学术研究和鉴赏的对象。” 稍后,苏珊·桑塔格在美国知识圈中异军突起,她努力让艺术批评民主化。60年代中期她有两篇开创性的文章,《反对阐释》和《一种文化与新感受力》,分别指出,西方文化迷恋对艺术作品——特别是文学作品进行阐释,这迫使评论家去寻找意义。阐释令评论的自发性出现枯竭,她主张评论家要注意感官体验而不是文本阐释;艺术的目的通常是产生乐趣,新感受力对艺术的内容要求更少,对形式和风格的乐趣则更开放…… 桑塔格认为老一派的文化权威扼阻了对大众艺术的欣赏。她提出的新感受力能够在美国批评传统之外重新定义艺术,让这个国家的文化更加开放鲜活。抛弃了品味上的偏见,美国文化终于变成了Macdonald所指出的、也是凯尔所担心的——Masscult以Midcult标准泛滥的局面。 回头看萨里斯和凯尔的争论,暴露出新时代的不少问题。他们两位都明白电影是高雅文化和通俗文化之间的桥梁,也都促进了电影批评也是知识分子正当追求这一理念。但是,在新时代如何界定批评家的角色,两人仍有重大分歧。一方面,凯尔的影评成为连接观众和银幕之间的重要纽带,她的权威地位在作品和观众两方面都有影响。她向观众解释电影,又把观众对电影的反应反馈给电影工作者。萨里斯与她不同,他让影评更加民主化,重新定义了批评和艺术的权威。在萨里斯的电影世界里,每个人都可以成为影评人,所有的电影工作者都是艺术家。当然他并不相信世界上的每个人在评论电影和制作电影的能力上一样娴熟。他的想法基于一种非常革命的假设,影评人和艺术家不必用特定的方式来对待。也就是说,年轻的Phillip Lopate可以和《纽约时报》的Bosley Crowther一样权威,霍华德·霍克斯可以得到与其他导演一样的尊重。萨里斯的方法关键在于用新的语汇揭示过去从未被认为存在过的艺术。 深奥难懂对很多人来说是萨里斯的影评的主要魅力。另外,当萨里斯正在创造一个全新的影评流派之际,与之般配的新一代电影也适时出现——深奥的影评与暧昧的影片相得益彰。尽管这一现象令许多老影评人倍感困惑与挫折,但无疑它引领着一个波澜壮阔的青年观影时代的到来…… 14/11/2008 鸡尾酒里的现象学《从胡塞尔到德里达》某种意义上更像是一本连贯的哲学笔记。在目前处处强调学术标准化的情形下,这样的称法很容易引起误解。但我在这里丝毫没有贬义的意思,相反,而是表示着对于某种几乎完全消失的传统的缅怀。人文学术走向规范化和标准化,起始于自然科学在近代勃兴,并高度组织化的现代社会中迅速地成为一种普世价值。在哲学、艺术领域一直占有一席之地的游牧式、自耕自足式思考方式和惯例,在科学化的标准思考方式排挤下,逐渐在正统学术系统中失去了合法性和生存空间。同时,自然科学技术产生经济效能的周期越来越短,其与社会发展的维系越来越紧密了,这也意味着大学以及研究机构与普通大众之间的距离越来越近,他们的互动变得密切而且深入。 这种情形在近代以后的各个人文学科里十分普遍。学科分支越来越精细,学科内部的视野越来越狭窄,它们都只是自然科学这个巨大真理下的一块小小自耕地。自然科学强调客观性和普遍性,在研究中必须要把个人经验排除掉,久而久之,那个面对着这些现象的“我”被遗忘了。在这块坚硬、板结的领域中,这个“我”被假设作不存在。胡塞尔在对整个近代哲学进行反思时,某种意义上就是面对着这样的一个思想现实。在他看来,思想若要有所发展,必须先破除对自然科学的迷信。 在胡塞尔看来,梳理出这个“我”与现象之间的关系,对于哲学进展意义重大,不过却任重而道远,因为事实上要从我们所认识的现象中剥离出这个“我”是异常困难的。这是一个经过现象学还原而剩余的“我”。这个“我”似乎是从天而降的,它是一个在西方哲学中很少出现的纯粹思考主体。在《从》的作者看来,这是一个新的思考原点。它改变了思考的坐标系,它在思想史上的重要性在某种程度上相当于哥白尼的太阳中心说。在胡塞尔看来,它不是物理时空中的物质事实,而是一种“片面的经验直观”。现象学不是事实的科学,“事实是一些偶然的东西”“事实本身”无法显现的,我们得到的只能是“从某个位置看见事实的某一方面”。这种位置和角度的限制是无法避免的,意向性分析可以使我们清晰地意识到这一点。在这个意义上,胡塞尔强调要放宽眼界(horizons),眼界决定了一切,决定了人的自身限定,我们的思考惯性建构了我们思考的可能性。 沿着胡塞尔的思想踪迹,《从》在舍勒、克尔凯郭尔、海德格尔、列维纳斯、德里达这些思想大家底下梳理出一条细微幽暗的现象学线索。在作者看来,放宽眼界就已经包含了很明显的解构意味,并且德里达对形而上学的批判,也可以追溯到胡塞尔。作者认为解构主义的根子在现象学那里。二十世纪思想中纷纷扬扬的“上帝死了”,“人死了”,“作者死了”,这些在某种程度上都有着一个相同的思考根基,那就是对于旧有思考主体的彻底非中心化。在这一点上一语中的的,正是胡塞尔。 当然胡塞尔不是天外来客,他的反思承接于笛卡尔。笛卡尔的反思体现在他那句令人猛然惊醒的警句中。这句过于出名的警句被许多“我运动,我存在”之类的广告改造下变得十分时髦,也变得面目全非。笛卡尔所强调的“我思”并非通常所为的、陷于日常生活和学术惯性逻辑之中的思考,而是从这些逻辑中跳脱出来的反思。这个“我”必须是从这些限制我们的逻辑中跳脱出来之后,才“存在”的。这与我们时下所理解的意思很不一致。作者认为这样的思考主体,事实上与康德哲学中那个“先验”的我之间有着内在的联系,这条内在的思想踪迹一直延伸到胡塞尔这里,才突然在现象学的背景下暴发出惊人的力量,开掘出一个全新的讨论领域。 中国学者讨论西方思想的著作,由于种种原因,近来出现越来越热的景象。这是好事,不过也存在着一些显而易见的问题。或是食而不化的拿来主义,或是概念和理路完全不对称的“伪对话”,总的来说,贪大求新的功利倾向十分明显。这样就不可避免地使我们围着几个热门思想者打转,很难进入到活的思想史当中,从西方学术思路本身去思考和感受那些隐秘幽深的内在思想路径,这样就导致了新词乱飞,“体系林立”,研究很难进入到精微的思想积层中。 近代启蒙哲学以后形成的使用“大字眼”的习惯,在思维定势上强调“共同性”,而忽视思想路数之间的微妙差异。在《从》的作者看来,“这些微妙的不同往往是巨大而深刻的”。这其实也是作者行书的风格,他往往在一两个术语上花上许多时间来甄别。这种对于思想细微踪迹的仔细勘察事实上对于进入到伟大思想的精微之处十分关键,可惜在我们时下的学术制度和风气下,这种传统已经丧失殆尽了。 这种风气加上从自然科学方面承继过来的对于经验的排斥,学术思考很容易变得庞大而空洞,片面强调学科整体性而越来越远离人的存在本身。这让我想起西蒙·波伏瓦记录的一段哲学史逸事。在萨特的哲学思想刚刚起步时,一切陷于困顿。其好友雷蒙·阿隆在柏林研究胡塞尔的现象学回来,在一次酒吧相聚时,阿隆指着酒杯里的鸡尾酒说,你若是现象学家,那么就可以用这杯鸡尾酒来谈出许多哲学来。这话击中了萨特的要害。人与事物的接触、感觉在哲学思考中被遗忘太久了。萨特当即决定去柏林学习现象学,迈出了其哲学生涯的第一步。这对于萨特个人来说,有着相当的偶然性。但对于胡塞尔之后的思想史而言,却是充满着必然的。只有鸡尾酒里的现象学显现出来,思想才回到了现实的大地。(冯欣,写于2008.07.28)
尚杰:《从胡塞尔到德里达》,江苏人民出版社,2008年4月 05/11/2008 From Work to Text/Roland Barthes
It is a fact that over the last few years a certain change has taken place (or is taking place) in our conception of language and, consequently, of the literary work which owes at least its phenomenal existence to this same language. The change is clearly connected with the current development of (amongst other disciplines) linguistics, anthropology, Marxism and psychoanalysis (the term 'connection' is used here in a deliberately neutral way: one does not decide a determination, be it multiple and dialectical). What is new and which affects the idea of the work comes not necessarily from the internal recasting of each of these disciplines, but rather from their encounter in relation to an object which traditionally is the province of none of them. It is indeed as though the interdisciplinarity which is today held up as a prime value in research cannot be accomplished by the simple confrontation of specialist branches of knowledge. Interdisciplinarity is not the calm of an easy security; it begins effectively (as opposed to the mere expression of a pious wish) when the solidarity of the old disciplines breaks down -- perhaps even violently, via the jolts of fashion -- in the interests of a new object and a new language neither of which has a place in the field of the sciences that were to be brought peacefully together, this unease in classification being precisely the point from which it is possible to diagnose a certain mutation. The mutation in which the idea of the work seems to be gripped must not, however, be over-estimated: it is more in the nature of an epistemological slide than of a real break. The break, as is frequently stressed, is seen to have taken place in the last century with the appearance of Marxism and Freudianism; since then there has been no further break, so that in a way it can be said that for the last hundred years we have been living in repetition. What History, our History, allows us today is merely to slide, to vary, to exceed, to repudiate. Just as Einsteinian science demands that the relativity of the frames of reference be included in the object studied, so the combined action of Marxism, Freudianism and structuralism demands, in literature, the relativization of the relations of writer, reader and observer (critic). Over against the traditional notion of the work, for long -- and still -- conceived of in a, so to speak, Newtonian way, there is now the requirement of a new object, obtained by the sliding or overturning of former categories. That object is the Text. I know the word is fashionable (I am myself often led to use it) and therefore regarded by some with suspicion, but that is exactly why I should like to remind myself of the principal propositions at the intersection of which I see the Text as standing. The word 'proposition' is to be understood more in a grammatical than in a logical sense: the following are not argumentations but enunciations, 'touches', approaches that consent to remain metaphorical. Here then are these propositions; they concern method, genres, signs, plurality, filiation, reading and pleasure.
1. The Text is not to be thought of as an object that can be computed. It would be futile to try to separate out materially works from texts. In particular, the tendency must be avoided to say that the work is classic, the text avant-garde; it is not a question of drawing up a crude honours list in the name of modernity and declaring certain literary productions 'in' and others 'out' by virtue of their chronological situation: there may be 'text' in a very ancient work, while many products of contemporary literature are in no way texts. The difference is this: the work is a fragment of substance, occupying a part of the space of books (in a library for example), the Text is a methodological field. The opposition may recall (without at all reproducing term for term) Lacan's distinction between 'reality' and 'the real': the one is displayed, the other demonstrated; likewise, the work can be seen (in bookshops, in catalogues, in exam syllabuses), the text is a process of demonstration, speaks according to certain rules (or against certain rules); the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in language, only exists in the movement of a discourse (or rather, it is Text for the very reason that it knows itself as text); the Text is not the decomposition of the work, it is the work that is the imaginary tail of the Text; or again, the Text is experienced only in an activity of production. It follows that the Text cannot stop (for example on a library shelf); its constitutive movement is that of cutting across (in particular, it can cut across the work, several works).
2. In the same way, the Text does not stop at (good) Literature; it cannot be contained in a hierarchy, even in a simple division of genres. What constitutes the Text is, on the contrary (or precisely), its subversive force in respect of the old classifications. How do you classify a writer like Georges Bataille? Novelist, poet, essayist, economist, philosopher, mystic? The answer is so difficult that the literary manuals generally prefer to forget about Bataille who, in fact, wrote texts, perhaps continuously one single text. If the Text poses problems of classification (which is furthermore one of its 'social functions), this is because it always involves a certain experience of limits (to take up an expression from Philippe Sollers). Thibaudet used already to talk -- but in a very restricted sense -- of limit-works (such as Chateaubriand's Vie de Rancé, which does indeed come through to us today as a 'text'); the Text is that which goes to the limit of the rules of enunciation (rationality, readability, etc.). Nor is this a rhetorical idea, resorted to for some 'heroic' effect: the Text tries to place itself very exactly behind the limit of the doxa (is not general opinion -- constitutive of our democratic societies and powerfully aided by mass communications -- defined by its limits, the energy with which it excludes, its censorship?). Taking the word literally, it may be said that the Text is always paradoxical.
3. The Text can be approached, experienced, in reaction to the sign. The work closes on a signified. There are two modes of signification which can be attributed to this signified: either it is claimed to be evident and the work is then the object of a literal science, of philology, or else it is considered to be secret, ultimate, something to be sought out, and the work then falls under the scope of a hermeneutics, of an interpretation (Marxist, psychoanalytic, thematic, etc.); in short, the work itself functions as a general sign and it is normal that it should represent an institutional category of the civilization of the Sign. The Text, on the contrary, practises the infinite deferment of the signified, is dilatory; its field is that of the signifier and the signifier must not be conceived of as 'the first stage of meaning', its material vestibule, but, in complete opposition to this, as its deferred action. Similarly, the infinity of the signifier refers not to some idea of the ineffable (the unnameable signified) but to that of a playing; the generation of the perpetual signifier (after the fashion of a perpetual calendar) in the field of the text (better, of which the text is the field) is realized not according to an organic progress of maturation or a hermeneutic course of deepening investigation, but, rather, according to a serial movement of disconnections, overlappings, variations. The logic regulating the Text is not comprehensive (define 'what the work means') but metonymic; the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy (lacking it, man would die); the work in the best of cases -- is moderately symbolic (its symbolic runs out, comes to a halt); the Text is radically symbolic: a work conceived, perceived and received in its integrally symbolic nature is a text. Thus is the Text restored to language; like language, it is structured but off-centred, without closure (note, in reply to the contemptuous suspicion of the 'fashionable' sometimes directed at structuralism, that the epistemological privilege currently accorded to language stems precisely from the discovery there of a paradoxical idea of structure: a system with neither close nor centre).
4. The Text is plural. Which is not simply to say that it .has several meanings, but that it accomplishes the very plural of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely an acceptable) plural. The Text is not a co-existence of meanings but a passage, an overcrossing; thus it answers not to an interpretation, even a liberal one, but to an explosion, a dissemination. The plural of the Text depends, that is, not on the ambiguity of its contents but on what might be called the stereographic plurality of its weave of signifiers (etymologically, the text is a tissue, a woven fabric). The reader of the Text may be compared to someone at a loose end (someone slackened off from any imaginary); this passably empty subject strolls -- it is what happened to the author of these lines, then it was that he had a vivid idea of the Text -- on the side of a valley, a oued flowing down below (oued is there to bear witness to a certain feeling of unfamiliarity); what he perceives is multiple, irreducible, coming from a disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives: lights, colours, vegetation, heat, air, slender explosions of noises, scant cries of birds, children's voices from over on the other side, passages, gestures, clothes of inhabitants near or far away. All these incidents are half identifiable: they come from codes which are known but their combination is unique, founds the stroll in a difference repeatable only as difference. So the Text: it can be it only in its difference (which does not mean its individuality), its reading is semelfactive (this rendering illusory any inductive-deductive science of texts -- no 'grammar' of the text) and nevertheless woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages (what language is not?), antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it through and through in a vast stereophony. The intertextual in which every text is held, it itself being the text-between of another text, is not to be confused with some origin of the text: to try to find the 'sources', the 'influences' of a work, is to fall in with the myth of filiation; the citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, untraceable, and yet already read: they are quotations without inverted commas. The work has nothing disturbing for any monistic philosophy (we know that there are opposing examples of these); for such a philosophy, plural is the Evil. Against the work, therefore, the text could well take as its motto the words of the man possessed by demons (Mark 5: 9): 'My name is Legion: for we are many.' The plural of demoniacal texture which opposes text to work can bring with it fundamental changes in reading, and precisely in areas where monologism appears to be the Law: certain of the 'texts' of Holy Scripture traditionally recuperated by theological monism (historical or anagogical) will perhaps offer themselves to a diffraction of meanings (finally, that is to say, to a materialist reading), while the Marxist interpretation of works, so far resolutely monistic, will be able to materialize itself more by pluralizing itself (if, however, the Marxist 'institutions' allow it).
5. The work is caught up in a process of filiation. Are postulated: a determination of the work by the world (by race, then by History), a consecution of works amongst themselves, and a conformity of the work to the author. The author is reputed the father and the owner of his work: literary science therefore teaches respect for the manuscript and the author's declared intentions, while society asserts the legality of the relation of author to work (the 'droit d'auteur' or 'copyright', in fact of recent date since it was only really legalized at the time of the French Revolution). As for the Text, it reads without the inscription of the Father. Here again, the metaphor of the Text separates from that of the work: the latter refers to the image of an organism which grows by vital expansion, by 'development' (a word which is significantly ambiguous, at once biological and rhetorical); the metaphor of the Text is that of the network; if the Text extends itself, it is as a result of a combinatory systematic (an image, moreover, close to current biological conceptions of the living being). Hence no vital 'respect' is due to the Text: it can be broken (which is just what the Middle Ages did with two nevertheless authoritative texts -- Holy Scripture and Aristotle); it can be read without the guarantee of its father, the restitution of the inter-text paradoxically abolishing any legacy. It is not that the Author may not 'come back' in the Text, in his text, but he then does so as a 'guest'. If he is a novelist, he is inscribed in the novel like one of his characters, figured in the carpet; no longer privileged, paternal, aletheological, his inscription is ludic. He becomes, as it were, a paper-author: his life is no longer the origin of his fictions but a fiction contributing to his work; there is a reversion of the work on to the life (and no longer the contrary); it is the work of Proust, of Genet which allows their lives to be read as a text. The word 'bio-graphy' re-acquires a strong, etymological sense, at the same time as the sincerity of the enunciation -- veritable 'cross" borne by literary morality -- becomes a false problem: the I which writes the text, it too, is never more than a paper-I.
6. The work is normally the object of a consumption; no demagogy is intended here in referring to the so-called consumer culture but it has to be recognized that today it is the 'quality' of the work (which supposes finally an appreciation of 'taste') and not the operation of" reading itself which can differentiate between books: structurally, there is no difference between 'cultured reading and casual reading in trains. The Text (if only by its frequent 'unreadability) decants the work (the work permitting) from its consumption and gathers it up as play, activity, production, practice. This means that the Text requires that one try to abolish (or at the very least to diminish) the distance between writing and reading, in no way by intensifying the projection of the reader into the work but by joining them in a single signifying practice. The distance separating reading from writing is historical. In the times of the greatest social division (before the setting up of democratic cultures), reading and writing were equally privileges of class. Rhetoric, the great literary code of those times, taught one to write (even if what was then normally produced were speeches, not texts). Significantly, the coming of democracy reversed the word of command: what the (secondary) School prides itself on is teaching to read (well) and no longer to write (consciousness of the deficiency is becoming fashionable again today: the teacher is called upon to teach pupils to express themselves', which is a little like replacing a form of repression by a misconception). In fact, reading, in the sense of consuming, is far from playing with the text. 'Playing' must be understood here in all its polysemy: the text itself plays (like a door, like a machine with 'play') and the reader plays twice over, playing the Text as one plays a game, looking for a practice which re-produces it, but, in order that that practice not be reduced to a passive, inner mimesis (the Text is precisely that which resists such a reduction), also playing the Text in the musical sense of the term. The history of music (as a practice, not as an 'art') does indeed parallel that of the Text fairly closely: there was a period when practising amateurs were numerous (at least within the confines of a certain class) and 'playing' and 'listening' formed a scarcely differentiated activity; then two roles appeared in succession, first that of the performer, the interpreter to whom the bourgeois public (though still itself able to play a little -- the whole history of ) the piano) delegated its playing, then that of the (passive) amateur, who listens to music without being able to play (the gramophone record takes the place of the piano). We know that today post-serial music has radically altered the role of the 'interpreter', who is called on to be in some sort the co-author of the score, completing it rather than giving it 'expression'. The Text is very much a score of this new kind: it asks of the reader a practical collaboration. Which is an important change, for who executes the work? (Mallarmé posed the question, wanting the audience to produce the book). Nowadays only the critic executes the work (accepting the play on words). The reduction of reading to a consumption is clearly responsible for the Boredom' experienced by many in the face of the modern ('unreadable') text, the avant-garde film or painting: to be bored means that one cannot produce the text, open it out, set it going.
7. This leads us to pose (to propose) a final approach to the Text, that of pleasure. I do not know whether there has ever been a hedonistic aesthetics (eudaemonist philosophies are themselves rare). Certainly there exists a pleasure of the work (of certain works); I can delight in reading and re-reading Proust, Flaubert, Balzac, even -- why not? -- Alexandre Dumas. But this pleasure, no matter how keen and even when free from all prejudice, remains in part (unless by some exceptional critical effort) a pleasure of consumption; for if I can read these authors, I also know that I cannot re-write them (that it is impossible today to write 'like that') and this knowledge, depressing enough, suffices to cut me off from the production of these works, in the very moment their remoteness establishes my modernity (is not to be modern to know clearly what cannot be started over again?) As for the Text, it is bound to jouissance, that is to a pleasure without separation. Order of the signifier, the Text participates in its own way in a social utopia; before History (supposing the latter does not opt for barbarism), the Text achieves, if not the transparence of social relations, that at least of language relations: the Text is that space where no language has a hold over any other, where languages circulate (keeping the circular sense of the term).
These few propositions, inevitably, do not constitute the articulations of a Theory of the Text and this is not simply the result of the failings of the person here presenting them (who in many respects has anyway done no more than pick up what is being developed round about him). It stems from the fact that a Theory of the Text cannot be satisfied by a metalinguistic exposition: the destruction of meta-language, or at least (since it may be necessary provisionally to resort to meta-language) its calling into doubt, is part of the theory itself: the discourse on the Text should itself be nothing other than text, research, textual activity, since the Text is that social space which leaves no language safe, outside, nor any subject of the enunciation in position as judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder. The theory of the Text can coincide only with a practice of writing.
1971 Translated by Stephen Heath |
|
|